David: Eliezer, I’ve read Good and Real, agree with you on topics as varied as Everett andBayesian rationalism; but I still don’t “get” your theory of consciousness. For example, a human undergoing a state of blind uncontrollable panic is no more capable of reflective self-awareness or any other form of meta-cognition than a panicking pig. The same neurotransmitter systems, same neurological pathways and same behavioural responses are involved in the panic response in both pigs and humans. So why is the human in a ghastly state of consciousness but the pig is just an insentient automaton?
Eliezer: One person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens: I’m not totally sure people in sufficiently unreflective flow-like states are conscious, and I give serious consideration to the proposition that I am reflective enough for consciousness only during the moments I happen to wonder whether I am conscious. This is not where most of my probability mass lies, but it’s on the table. I think I would be equally surprised to find monkeys conscious, or people in flow states nonsentient.
This has made me scared about Hansonian ems again. Also some other things.
Because it’s well known that flow states are really, really good at getting good performance, and in some cases also rapid improvement, in skills. (I’m thinking fire spinners, sometimes just referred to generally as flow arts, and musical practice.) And if that’s true, and they are also non-conscious/nonsentient, then even a mild em competition could result in the loss of literally everything that matters. Programming also has flow states, and if ems forked off nonsentient permanent flow-state forks to do further work and they stuck around for economic purposes, then we’ve lost the people.
(To say nothing of the potential issues this raises for hypnosis. Is a hypnosis subject nonsentient while the hypnotist plays with their head? If you make them forget what happened (very possible), do the hypnotist’s actions lose all (consequentialist) moral relevance?)
I give serious consideration to the proposition that I am reflective enough for consciousness only during the moments I happen to wonder whether I am conscious
This on the other hand, is somehow darkly hilarious, because it would suggest that the only suffering that matters in and of itself is existential angst. Destroy Camus! He’s Worse Than Hitler!